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Monetary Policy Spillovers and the Trilemma in the New Normal: 
Periphery Country Sensitivity to Core Country Conditions 
 
Joshua Aizenman*, Menzie D. Chinn†, Hiro Ito‡ 
USC and NBER; UW-Madison and NBER; Portland State University 
 
Abstract 
We investigate why and how the financial conditions of developing and emerging market countries 
(peripheral countries) can be affected by the movements in the center economies - the U.S., Japan, the 
Eurozone, and China.  We apply a two-step approach.  First, we estimate the sensitivity of countries’ 
financial variables to the center economies [policy interest rate, stock market prices, and the real effective 
exchange rates (REER)] while controlling for global and domestic factors. Next, we examine the 
association of the estimated sensitivity coefficients with the macroeconomic conditions, policies, real and 
financial linkages with the center economies, and the level of institutional development. In the last two 
decades, for most financial variables, the strength of the links with the center economies have been the 
dominant factor while the movements of policy interest rate also appear sensitive to global financial 
shocks around the emerging market crises of the late 1990s and since the global financial crisis of 2008. 
While certain macroeconomic and institutional variables are important, the arrangement of open macro 
policies such as the exchange rate regime and financial openness are also found to have direct influence 
on the sensitivity to the center economies. An economy that pursues greater exchange rate stability and 
financial openness faces a stronger link with the center economies through policy interest rates and real 
effective exchange rate (REER) movements. We also find exchange market pressure (EMP) in peripheral 
economies is sensitive to the movements of the center economies’ REER and EMP during and after the 
global financial crisis. Open macro policy arrangements, especially exchange rate regimes, also have 
indirect effects on the strength of financial linkages, interacting with other macroeconomic conditions. 
Thus, trilemma policy arrangements, including exchange rate flexibility, continue to affect the sensitivity 
of developing countries to policy changes and shocks in the center economies.   
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The integrated nature of the financial system was amply demonstrated by the turmoil in 
emerging market currency and bond markets in the wake of Fed Chairman Bernanke’s 
statements regarding the normalization of U.S. monetary policy in 2013 (“taper tantrum”). 
Following close on the heels of complaints about unconventional monetary policy 
implementation in the preceding years, it is clear that – at a minimum – policymakers in 
emerging market economies perceive an increasing vulnerability to the whims of the global 
financial system. 
The idea that the monetary policies of financial center countries have large spillover 
effects on the smaller economies is not new. During the mid-1990s, when advanced economy 
central bankers raised policy rates, after several years of negative real interest rates, similar 
complaints were lodged, and some may partly trace the financial crises in Latin America and 
subsequently in East Asia to the cycle in core country policy interest rates.  
One key difference is that in the earlier episode’s aftermath, the semi-fixed exchange rate 
regimes were tagged as a contributing factor. In contrast, countries adhering to a variety of 
exchange rate regimes all experienced challenges in insulating their economies in the most recent 
episode. This has led to a grand debate about the continued relevance of the “impossible trinity” 
or “monetary trilemma”. 
Since Mundell (1963) outlined the hypothesis of the monetary trilemma, fundamental 
policy management in the open economy has been viewed as policy trade-offs among the choices 
of monetary autonomy, exchange rate stability, and financial openness.4  The hypothesis and its 
extensions in recent years suggest a continuous trade off between the three trilemma dimensions, 
with the possibility that a fourth policy goal, financial stability, may augment it and turn it into a 
quadrilemma where international reserves may play a role as buffers (Aizenman, 2013).   
In contrast, in the aftermath of the global financial crisis (GFC), Rey (2013) concluded 
that the economic center’s (CE) monetary policy influences other countries’ national monetary 
policy mostly through capital-flows, credit growth, and bank leverages, making the types of 
exchange rate regime of the non-CEs irrelevant. In other words, the countries in the periphery 
(PH) are all sensitive to a “global financial cycle” irrespective of exchange rate regimes. In this 
                                                            
4 See Aizenman, et al. (2010, 2011, 2013), Obstfeld (2014), Obstfeld, et al. (2005), and Shambaugh (2004) for 




view, the “trilemma” reduces to an “irreconcilable duo” of monetary independence and capital 
mobility. Consequently, restricting capital-mobility may be the only way for non-EC countries to 
retain monetary autonomy. The recent experience of Brazil, India, Indonesia, South Africa, and 
Turkey – the “Fragile Five” – during the taper tantrum episode may make the “irreconcilable duo” 
view convincing to many observers.  
In this paper, we investigate whether Rey’s view means the end of the trilemma 
hypothesis or a premature prediction that is not supported by the data. Inferences based on the 
data from the times of heightened volatility emanating from the CE might be modified once we 
examine how the propagation of large shocks from the EC can be affected by economic 
structures and measures of the trilemma variables.  In a world of more than hundred countries, 
one ignores heterogeneity at one’s own risk. For instance, the trade-offs facing the OECD 
countries may differ from emerging markets economies and developing countries as well as 
whether they are manufacturing- or commodity-based economies.5  Furthermore, large shocks 
from the EC during the GFC and the following Euro debt crisis may have altered the 
transmission dynamics, especially in comparison to the preceding decade of illusory tranquility.6 
Many studies such as Ahmed and Zlate (2013), Forbes and Warnock (2010), Fratzscher 
(2011), and Ghosh, et al. (2012) have documented the importance of global factors such as 
advanced economy interest rates and global risk appetite in affecting capital flows to small open 
economies. Nonetheless, these studies have also highlighted that domestic, country-specific 
factors also retain importance. In particular, the institutional and macroeconomic policy 
frameworks of the emerging market economies also determine the variations in flows.  
Given this context, we focus on the questions of why movements in the major advanced 
economies often have large effects on other financial markets, how these cross-market linkages 
have changed over time, and what kind of factors contribute to explaining the sensitivity to the 
movements in the major economies. More specifically, we conduct an empirical analysis on what 
determines the sensitivity of economies to factors pertaining to the core economies in the world, 
specifically, the U.S., the Euro area, Japan, and China. 
                                                            
5 For example, maintaining exchange rate stability could be more important for developing countries whose growth 
strategy is reliant on the exports of a narrower variety of manufactured goods or commodities than advanced 
economies with more diversified economic structures.  
6 As one indirect evidence, Aizenman, et al. (2015) show that the global financial crisis of 2008 caused structural 




 In Section 2, we detail the framework of the exercise we employ for our empirical 
exploration. We report and discuss the estimation results in section 3. In Section 4, we further 
extend the analysis by investigating the sensitivity of the exchange market pressure (EMP) in 
peripheral economies to the movements of the center economies’ financial variables and its 
determinants. In Section 5, we make concluding remarks.   
 
2. The Empirical Methodology 
For our empirical exploration, we employ an estimation process similar to that employed 
by Forbes and Chinn (2004), which is composed of two steps of estimations. First, we investigate 
the degree of the sensitivity of several important financial variables to global, cross-country, and 
domestic factors. Second, treating the estimated sensitivity as a dependent variable, we examine 
their determinants among a number of country-specific variables. In so doing, we disentangle 
roles of countries’ macroeconomic conditions or policies, real or financial linkage with the center 
economy, or the level of institutional development of the countries. 
 
2.1 The First-Step: Estimating Sensitivity Coefficients 
The main objective of this first step estimation is to estimate the correlation of a specific 
financial variable between country i and each of the center economies while controlling for 
global and domestic factors. The estimated coefficient of our focus is CFi̂ . A significantly 
positive CFi̂  indicates a closer linkage between country i and economic center country C, as 
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Where the GiZ is a vector of global factors, the 
C
iX is a vector of cross-country factors, and Yit is 
a control variable for domestic factors. C represents the center economies: the U.S., the Euro 
area, Japan, and China. Cii̂ , the estimate of our focus, represents the extent of sensitivity of a 
financial variable ( FitR ) to cross-country factors, or more specifically, linkages to the four major 




term policy interest rate and the rate of change in the real effective exchange rate (REER). We 
also tested the linkages of stock market price changes and the sovereign bond spread between the 
center and non-center economies. However, the results are much less robust or yield fewer 
insightss at times. Hence, we omit reporting and discussing the results, though they can be found 
in our working paper version of this article (Aizenman, et al., 2015). 
We use money market rates to represent policy short-term interest rate. In recent years, 
all of the advanced major economies, the U.S., the Euro area, and Japan have implemented 
extremely loose monetary policy in the aftermath of the global financial crisis (GFC). Given that 
both the U.S. and Japan have lowered their policy interest rates down to or near zero, official 
policy interest rates may not capture the actual state of monetary policy. In recent years, several 
researchers have estimated “shadow interest rates” to represent the actual state of liquidity 
availability by allowing the estimated shadow rates to drop below the zero bound. We use these 
shadow rates for the three advanced economies to estimate more realistic correlations between 
the policy interest rates of the center economies and the sample countries. For the U.S. and the 
Euro area, we use the shadow interest rates estimated by Wu and Xia (2014). For Japan, we use 
the shadow rates estimated by Christensen and Rudebusch (2014). We use the REER indices 
from the IMF’s International Financial Statistics (IFS).  
For a vector of global factors ( GiZ ), we have two subsets of global factors. The first 
subset of global factors include “real” variables – global interest rates (for which we will use the 
first principal component of U.S. Federal Reserve, ECB, and Bank of Japan’s policy interest 
rates); oil prices; and commodity prices. When we estimate for the policy interest rate correlation, 
we do not include the first component of U.S. FRB, ECB, and Bank of Japan’s interest rates as 
part of the global factor vector because it would overlap with XC. To avoid multicollinearity or 
redundancy, we also use the first principal component of oil and commodity prices as a control 
variable for input or commodity prices.7  
The second subset is “financial.” In this group, we include the VIX index from the 
Chicago Board Options Exchange (CBOE), as a proxy for the extent of investors’ risk aversion, 
and the “Ted spread,” which is the difference between the 3-month Eurodollar Deposit Rate in 
                                                            
7 To control for global macroeconomic conditions, we also tested the growth rate of world trade as one of the 
variables in the vector of real global factors. It turned out that including this variable does not change the results for 
both the first and second stage estimations. To keep the model parsimonious and save the degree of freedom, we 




London (LIBOR) and the 3-month U.S. Treasury Bill yield. This latter measure gauges the 
general level of stress in the money market for financial institutions. The same set of global 
factors, except for the principal components of the global interest rates, is used for all the 
estimations regardless of the dependent variable. 
The vector of cross-country linkage factors (XC) corresponds to the dependent variable. 
For example, if the short-term interest rate for country i is the dependent variable, CiX includes 
the short-term interest rates of the four center economies.8 We implement the estimation for each 
of the sample countries for the two dependent variables and for the sample period of 1986 
through 2012. To control for domestic economic conditions, we include the year-on-year growth 
rate of industrial production index. All the data used for this exercise are of monthly frequency. 
The same set of explanatory variables (except for the world interest rate) is regressed against the 
two financial variables.  
Because we deal with a relatively long sample period, coefficient instability is a concern. 
Hence, we estimate the above regressions for each of the three year non-overlapping panels, 
starting in 1986.9 That means that CFit̂ is time-varying across the panels.  
We also estimate two specifications. One specification excludes China as one of the 
“center economies.” In this model setup, we are testing the sensitivity of our sample economies 
to the traditionally-defined major economies of the U.S., the Euro area, and Japan.10 The other 
model does include China as one of the center economies.  
Our panel data are composed of about 100 countries including both advanced economies 
(IDC) and less developed countries (LDC), with the sample size varying depending on data 
availability. In our sample, the U.S. and Japan are not included in any of estimates. As for the 
Euro member countries, they are removed from the sample after the introduction of the euro in 
January 1999 or they become member countries, whichever comes first. We also have a 
subsample of emerging market countries (EMG) within the LDC subsample.11 
 
2.2 The Second Step: Explaining the Sensitivity Coefficients 
                                                            
8 For the Euro Area’s variables before the introduction of the euro in 1999, the GDP-weighted average of the 
variable of concern for the original 12 Euro countries is calculated and included in the estimation.  
9 We also tested using five year panels. Since the results are qualitatively similar, we decide not to report the results. 
10 Excluding China mitigates data limitations as well, especially for the second-step of the estimation procedure. 
11 The emerging market countries (EMG) are defined as the countries classified as either emerging or frontier during 




Once we estimate CFit for each of the dependent variables, we regress 
C
Fit̂  on a number of 
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There are four groups of explanatory variables. The first group of explanatory variables is 
a set of open macroeconomic policy choices ( iOMP), for which we include the indexes for 
exchange rate stability (ERS) and financial openness (KAOPEN) from the trilemma indexes by 
Aizenman, et al. (2013).12 A country that has a fixed exchange rate arrangement with a major 
country, or the base country, is more subject to financial shocks occurring to the base country if 
it has more open financial markets. Saxena (2008) found the extent of pass-through from foreign 
interest rates to domestic interest rates is higher under floating exchange rate regimes than 
pegging regimes, however.13 Christiansen and Pigott (1997) also suggest that even under floating 
exchange rate regimes, foreign factors play an important role in affecting long-term interest rates. 
Hence, it is an empirical question how and to what extent both financial openness and exchange 
rate stability matter for transmitting financial shocks.14 As another variable potentially closely 
related to the trilemma framework, we suspect the level of international reserves (IR) holding 
may affect the extent of cross-country financial linkages and include the variable for IR holding 
(excluding gold) as a share of GDP.15  
The group iMC  includes macroeconomic conditions such as inflation volatility, current 
account balance, and public finance conditions. As the measure of public finance conditions, we 
include either gross national debt or general budget balance, both expressed as shares of GDP. 
                                                            
12 As Mundell (1963) argued and Aizenman, et al. (2013) and Ito and Kawai (2012) have empirically shown it holds, 
a country may simultaneously choose any two, but not all, of the three goals of monetary policy independence, 
exchange rate stability, and financial market openness to the full extent. Given this linearity, we only include the two 
trilemma indexes out of the three.  
13 To explain the counterintuitive results, Saxena argues that the classification of exchange rate regimes may allow 
some of the countries that conduct active but incomplete foreign exchange interventions to be classified as “floating” 
regimes so that the results for the floating regimes may include those of de facto pegging regimes. Also, she argues 
countries with floating exchange rates tend to have more developed financial markets which tend to follow the trend 
of the center country’s financial markets.  
14 Gosh, et al. (2014, 2015) find that floating exchange rate regimes also help mitigate the extent of susceptibility to 
financial vulnerabilities, exchange rate vulnerability, and crisis occurrence. 
15 Aizenman, et al. (2010, 2011) show the macroeconomic impact of trilemma policy configurations can depend 




We use the data from the IMF’s International Financial Statistics and World Economic Outlook 
Database. 
In addition to these groups of variables, we will include variables that reflect the extent of 
linkages with the center countries (LINK). One linkage variable is meant to capture real, trade 
linkage, which we will measure as: ip
C
ipip GDPIMPLINKTR _  where 
C
iIMP is total imports 
into center economy C from country i, that is normalized by country i’s GDP. Another linkage 
variable is financial linkage, FIN_LINKip. We will measure it with the ratio of the total stock of 
foreign direct investment from country C in country i as a share of country i’s GDP 
( CiFDINV ).
16  
Another variable that also reflects the linkage with the major economies is the variable 
for the extent of trade competition (Trade_Comp). Trade_Comp measures the importance to 
country i of export competition in the third markets between country i and major country C. 
Shocks to country C, and especially shocks to country C that affects country c’s exchange rate, 
could affect the relative price of country C’s exports and therefore affect country i through trade 
competition in third markets. See Appendix for the variable construction. A higher value of this 
measure indicates country i and major economic C exports products in similar sectors so that 
their exported products tend to be competitive to each other.  
The fourth group is composed of the variables that characterize the nature of institutional 
development (INST), namely, variables for financial development and legal development. As 
Caballero-Farhi-Gourinchas (2008) theoretically predict and Chinn and Ito (2007) empirically 
show, both Financial and legal development are important factors for the volume and directions 
of cross-border capital flows. Alfaro, et al. (2008) argue that institutional development is also an 
important factor. If these factors affect cross-border capital flows, they should also affect the 
extent of sensitivity to financial shocks occurring to the center economies. 
To measure the level of financial development, we use the first principal component of 
financial development (FD) using the data on private credit creation, stock market capitalization, 
stock market total value, and private bond market capitalization all as shares of GDP. 
Additionally, we also include as a measure of legal development the first principal component of 
                                                            
16 We also tried the variable for bank lending provided by the center economies. However, since it turned out to be 




law and order (LAO), bureaucratic quality (BQ), and anti-corruption measures (CORRUPT), all 
from the ICRG database. Higher values of these variables indicate better conditions. 
The precision of CFit̂  could be reduced by economic or financial disruptions. To control 
for that, we include a vector of currency and banking crises (CRISIS). We use the crisis dummies 
from Aizenman and Ito (2013) to identify the two types of the crises. For currency crisis, 
Aizenman and Ito use the exchange market pressure (EMP) index using the exchange rate 
against the currency of the base country. The banking crisis dummy is based on the papers by 
Laeven and Valencia (2008, 2010, 2012).  
The variables in MC and INST are included in the estimations as deviations from the U.S., 
Japanese, Chinese, and Euro Area’s counterparts. The variables in vectors OMP, MC, and INST 
are sampled from the first year of each three year panels to minimize the effect of potential 
endogeneity. Also, to capture global common shocks, we also include time fixed effects. 
Furthermore, to account for potential outliers on the dependent variable, we use the robust 
regression estimation technique for all the estimations. 
 
3. Empirical Results 
3.1 First-Step Estimations 
The Contributions of Different Factor Vectors 
For the first-step estimation, we regress each of the two dependent variables, policy 
interest rate and REER changes, on four groups of explanatory variables: real global, financial 
global, cross-country link, and domestic factors for three-year, non-overlapping panels in the 
1986-2012 period.  
To grasp the general trend of the groups of factors that influence the financial variables, 
we focus on the joint significance of the variables included in the real global, financial global, 
cross-country, and domestic groups. Figure 1 illustrates the proportion of countries for which the 
joint significance tests are found to be statistically significant (with the p-value less than 10%) 
for each of the four financial variables. The figure illustrates the proportion for the groups of 
advanced economies (IDC) and less developed economies (LDC) after 1992.17 Our discussions 
                                                            
17 The figures in Figure 1 are based upon the specification that includes China as a major economy while the figures 
based on the specification without China as a center economy yields similar observations. We also conduct the same 
exercise for the group of EMGs. The figures for the EMG group are qualitatively similar to those of the LDC group. 




focuses on the estimation results of developing countries although we also present the results of 
developed countries mainly for comparison purposes. 
The graphical depictions in Figure 1 lead to the following conclusions. First, the 
movements of both the policy interest rates and real effective exchange rates of the center 
economies explain most joint-significantly the variation of the variables for the non-center 
economies, indicating the influence of the major economies is the greatest for both financial 
variables.18  
Second, as far as policy interest rate is concerned, the proportion of joint significance is 
also relatively high for the group of “financial global” variables, especially for the EMG 
countries. Unsurprisingly, the last two three-year panels indicate high proportions of joint 
significance for both country groups, suggesting global financial factors have been playing an 
important role in affecting the policy interest of countries, both developed and developing. This 
result is consistent with the Rey’s (2013) thesis of “global financial cycles.” In the panels for 
1998-2000 and 2001-2003, the proportions of financial global factors also appear high for both 
country groups.19 Given the emerging market crises in the 1998-2000 period, and dot com bust 
of the 2001-2003 period, these results suggest that economies are more exposed to global 
financial shocks during periods of financial turbulence while also following center monetary 
policies. 
Third, for REER changes, the movements of the center economies are critically important 
for both country groups. Interestingly, the highest proportion of developing countries appear 
sensitive to the REER movements of the center economies in 2010-2012. These results are 
consistent with the reactions expressed by emerging market policy makers to the taper in Fed 
quantitative easing, especially those characterized as “Fragile Five.” 
Overall, in accord with Rey (2013), these figures suggest that economies, both advanced 
and developing, are subject to the financial conditions of the center economies. We investigate 
the determinants of the degree of sensitivity to the financial conditions of the center economies 
in the next subsection. 
 
                                                            
18 This observation is also applicable for sovereign term spreads and stock market price changes, though less 
significantly (not reported). The contribution of the major economies becomes bigger (not reported) for most of the 
financial variabels, which is expected considering that this group of economies have more developed and open 
financial markets. 




Contributions of China as a Major Economy 
Before moving on to examine the determinants of the degree of sensitivity to the CE’s 
financial conditions, let us question the assumption used thus far that China belongs in the set of 
CE’s. That question is motivated by the fact that, as documented in many studies, there is still 
much room for China to further develop and open its financial markets; hence its financial 
influence might not be proportionate to its economic output.20  
Hence, we test whether the results of the previous exercise of testing the joint 
significance of each vector of explanatory variables would be affected if we exclude China from 
the group of the CE’s. When we do, we find that the general characteristics observed in Figure 1 
remain qualitatively intact (results not reported), suggesting that the financial influence of China 
remains limited. 
To test this assertion more formally, we compare the adjusted R-squared values of the 
two specifications for each country and each three-year panel, and for each of the two financial 
variables. Figure 2 illustrates the cross-country average differences in the adjusted-R squared 
values between the estimation with China as one of the CE’s and the one without for both of the 
two financial variables. The averages of the gap are calculated for the groups of developed 
countries, developing countries, emerging market countries, and East Asian emerging market 
economies as a comparison.21 
In the case of the policy interest rate model, including China as a major country increases 
the adjusted R-squared, especially in the last three years of the 1990s that correspond to the East 
Asian crisis. For East Asian emerging market economies, including the Chinese policy interest 
rate in the estimation model increases the adjusted R-squared as much as over 15% on average. 
Despite the recent impressive rise as an economic power, however, China’s contribution seems 
negligible in the last two three-year panels for the policy interest rate model.  
In the REER figure, we see a high increase in the adjusted R-squared in the crisis years of 
2007-2009 for emerging market countries, especially those in East Asia (with the additional 
contribution of about 18% to the adjusted R-squared). This may reflect the situation where 
international trade shrank significantly immediately after the outbreak of the global financial 
                                                            
20 See Huang, et al. (2013) and Hung (2009) among others.  
21 The group of East Asian emerging market economies includes: Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, 




crisis in 2008. In the tight international trade market, trade competitiveness of the world’s largest 
exporter may have had a large influence on other trading partners. 
In the models for stock market price changes or sovereign term spreads, China does not 
appear influential in most of the sample period (not reported). Considering that China’s financial 
markets only became open recently, the lack of influence of China’s financial variables is 
unsurprising. Overall, despite certain periods when the country exerts some influence, we 
conclude that the financial influence of China is still minimal.22 
 
3.2 Results of the Second-Step Estimation 
Now that we have CFit̂ for both policy interest rates and REER changes, we investigate 
the determinants of the extent of linkages using the estimation model based on equation (2). We 
estimate the determinants of CFit̂  for the two financial variables but only use the dependent 
variable of CFi̂  from the first-step estimation that does not include China as one of the center 
economies because we concluded that the country’s financial influence in the global financial 
markets is minimal. The regressions with China as a center economy yield results qualitatively 
similar to those without China. 
Tables 1-1 and 1-2 report the estimation results for the extent of sensitivity of policy 
interest rates and REER changes for the FULL, LDC, and EMG samples. The bottom rows of the 
tables also report the joint significance tests for each vector of explanatory variables. 
As for the linkage of policy interest rates, reported in Table 1-1, the variables that 
characterize countries’ open macro policies affect the sensitivity to the monetary policies of the 
center economies. In contrast with Rey’s argument, we find that the type of exchange rate 
regimes does matter; countries with greater exchange rate stability tend to be more sensitive to 
changes in the CE’s monetary policy, though the estimate is only marginally significant, except 
for model (3). Financial openness also contributes to higher degrees of sensitivity to the CE’s 
policy interest rates, and its estimate is more persistently and strongly significant. These results 
suggest that developing countries or emerging market economies with more stable exchange rate 
movements as well as open financial markets are more subject to changes in the policy interest 
rates in the CE’s. Interestingly, holding higher levels of foreign reserves tend to help non-CE’s to 
                                                            
22 Our sample ends in 2012. Hence, the Shanghai stock market crash in 2015, that affected financial markets in other 




shield the impact of changes in the CE’s policy interest rates, i.e., to retain its monetary 
autonomy. Exchange rate stability, financial openness, and IR holding are jointly significant for 
the group of developing or emerging market countries.  
Among the variables for macroeconomic conditions, only the current account balance 
seems to matter. However, the positive estimate on the current account balance appears 
somewhat puzzling considering that a country running current account deficit – not surplus – 
should be more susceptible to monetary policy changes of the CE’s. The result indicates that a 
net capital exporter rather than importer is more sensitive to the monetary policies of the center 
economies. 
As for the external link factors, financial linkage through foreign direct investment is the 
most important variable in determining how shocks to the CE’s monetary policies affect those of 
other non-CE’s for both developing and emerging market countries. A country that receives 
more FDI from the CE’s tends to be more sensitive to changes in the monetary policies of the 
CE’s.  
Financial development also matters significantly for the LDC sample. In fact, its impact 
(i.e., the magnitude of the estimate) is found to larger among LDC’s than among IDC’s (results 
not reported). Countries with more developed financial markets tend to be more sensitive to the 
changes in the monetary policies of the CE’s. That suggests that countries with deep financial 
markets can be good investment destinations for foreign investors, so that their arbitrage actions 
may lead those countries to follow the monetary conditions of the CE’s more closely.  
Generally, the models for REER present robust results with good goodness-of-fit as 
Table 1-2 reports. Given certain degrees of price stickiness, pursuing greater exchange rate 
stability would lead both nominal and real effective exchange rate to be more sensitive to that of 
the CE’s. Our results show the positive impact of greater exchange rate stability on the REER 
connectivity for all the subsample country groups. Greater financial openness also contributes to 
greater sensitivity for developing countries, though not significantly so for the EMG group. 
Interestingly, irrespective of group, a country with a higher level of IR holding tends to be more 
sensitive to REER changes of the center economies. One interpretation is that a country could 
respond to changes in the center economies’ real currency appreciation through foreign exchange 
market interventions, inducing a positive correlation; the interpretation of this coefficient is then 




Emerging market countries with larger government debt or budget deficits tend to be less 
sensitive to the REER of the center economies. These results may reflect the fact that such 
countries, which likely face higher inflationary expectations, often face some difficulty in 
maintaining real exchange rate stability against the currencies of the major economies despite 
their general desire to pursue greater (nominal) exchange rate stability (Aizenman, et al. 2013, 
Calvo, et al. 2000).  
Not surprisingly, countries with greater bilateral trade links with the center economies 
tend to be more sensitive to the REER movements of the center economies. The negative impact 
of trade competitiveness means that peripheral countries with more competitive trade structure 
with those of the CE’s tend to become alternative investment destination if a shock occurs to the 
CE’s. For example, if a shock happens in a way that causes real depreciation of the CE’s 
currencies such as predicted slow output growth, an institutional change leading to greater labor 
rigidities, and a falling appetite for the center economies’ financial assets, the demand for 
financial assets in peripheral economies can rise and push the real values of their currencies. 
Interestingly, financial linkage through FDI does not matter for the level of REER connectivity. 
In contrast, countries with more developed financial markets tend to be less sensitive to 
the REER movements of the CE’s. These results are consistent with the observation that greater 
financial development allows a country to have more flexible exchange rate movements. In other 
words, countries could afford to detach their currency values’ movements from those of the 
center economies.  
 
3.3 Robustness Checks 
In the previous section, we reported results obtained using robust regression techniques 
that account for outliers in both the dependent variable and explanatory variables – the 
estimation keeps recursively down-weighting the outliers until it obtains converged estimates. To 
further ensure our results are not driven by outliers, we undertake additional sensitivity analyses.  
To begin with, we remove both the fifth and the 95th percentiles of the C̂ sample, and 
then re-estimate by reapplying the robust regression technique to the truncated sample. The 
results (not reported) remain qualitatively intact. While the magnitude of the estimates change, 
their statistical significance remain unchanged. When we repeat by removing the observations 




similar results. These findings indicate that the results we report in Tables 1-1 and 1-2 are not 
driven by outliers. 
Some of the countries in our sample have experienced financial crises. During periods of 
financial turbulence, economic variables could exhibit anomalous behavior, leading to extreme 
observations. Hence, as a second way to check the robustness of the estimation results, we 
interact all the independent variables with a dummy for currency crises to account for potential 
effects of currency crisis. For all the C̂ ’s of the three financial variables, we again obtain 
qualitatively similar results. Therefore, we conclude that our estimation results are not driven by 
extreme values of the explanatory and dependent variables during financial turbulences.  
 
4. Further Analyses 
4.1 Open Macro Policy in Conjunction with Other Factors 
In the baseline results of the previous subsection, open macro policy variables are found 
to affect the extent of connectivity through financial variables. While these variables may 
directly affect the extent of sensitivity to the center economies’ financial variables, it is also 
possible that they affect the financial linkages indirectly through other variables. 
To investigate this possibility, we re-estimate the specifications while including 
interactive terms between the variables for exchange rate stability and financial openness and 
some selected variables, namely, current account balances, government gross debt (both as a 
share of GDP), trade demand from the center economies, and the level of financial development. 
The results are reported in Tables 2-1 and 2-2 for policy interest rates and the REER, 
respectively.23 
We obtain several interesting results. First, while financial development alone would 
make developing countries more sensitive to center economies’ monetary policy changes, the 
sensitivity would be even greater if the country has more open financial markets or adopts more 
flexible exchange rate regime, although theoretically, more flexible exchange rate movements 
should make the country less subject to the monetary policies of the center economies, i.e., allow 
for greater monetary autonomy.  
                                                            
23 The estimates for inflation volatility, trade competition, legal development, and currency and banking crisis are 




Table 3 illustrates the net effects of certain changes in the level of macroeconomic or 
institutional variables (X) depending on the levels of both exchange rate stability (ERS) and 
financial openness (KAOPEN) – i.e.,   XKAOPENERS  210  . In the table, for a certain 
magnitude of change in X, ERS and KAOPEN take the values of zero, 0.50, or 1.00.  
Table 3 (a) shows the net impact of a 10 percentage points (ppt) increase in the level of 
financial development (as a deviation from the CE’s). From the table, we can see that, except for 
the cases of having a rigidly fixed exchange rate regime with intermediately open or closed 
financial markets, the net impact of a 10 ppt increase in the level of financial development is 
usually positive. The net impact on the connectivity through policy interest rates is larger for 
more financially open economies or those with more flexible exchange rate regimes. This 
counterintuitive result could possibly be rationalized by the high correlation between financial 
development and exchange rate flexibility; higher levels of financial development would lead a 
country to become more prepared to adopt greater exchange rate flexibility. Hence, a country 
with more developed financial markets and greater exchange rate flexibility could become a 
destination for investors’ arbitrage-seeking behavior once the CE’s change their monetary policy 
stance, thus leading to more synchronization of policy interest rates. This reasoning is consistent 
with the finding that the interactive effect between financial development and financial openness 
is positive.  
In Table 2-1, we also see a significant estimate for the interaction between ERS and 
import demand from the CE’s. Table 3 (b) reports the net impact of a 5 percentage points (ppt) 
increase in the level of import demand shows that the net impact is larger, or less negative, for 
economies with more open financial markets or more stable exchange rate regimes. Greater trade 
linkage leads to faster transmission of monetary policy from the center economies to peripheral 
economies in this globalized world especially when peripheral economies pursue exchange rate 
stability.24 
The types of trilemma regimes also affect the connectivity with the CE’s through REER 
changes. According to Table 3 (c), the net impact of a 2 ppt deterioration of current account 
balance (CAB) is larger for economies with more flexible exchange rate movements, while its 
                                                            
24 Such a positive interactive effect between import demand from the center economies and greater exchange rate 
stability is also observed in the estimation for the stock market price connectivity model (not reported). Peripheral 
economies that face strong trade demand from the center economies could be more sensitive to the stock market 




interactive effect with financial openness is negligible and insignificant. That is, if a shock 
occurs to the center economies’ REER, it would be transmitted to peripheral economies more 
through nominal exchange rate movements, especially for a country with worsening current 
account balances. Hence, given price rigidity, the shock to the CE’s would not be passed on to 
peripheral economies when they try to maintain exchange rate stability.  
Pursuit of greater exchange rate stability and financial openness also makes the net 
impact of gross debt larger for REER influences (Table 3 (d)). Holding a larger amount of debt 
makes a developing country more susceptible to the REER movement of the CE’s currencies if it 
pursues greater exchange rate stability and more financial integration, which is consistent with 
the economic characteristics of emerging market economies that had gone through financial 
crisis in the past. In those crises, a policy interest rate increase in the CE’s, usually the U.S., led 
first to real appreciation of the center economy’s currency, then transmitted to peripheral 
economies especially when an indebted country pegged their currencies to the center economy’s 
currency and had more open financial account. That may also mean that an indebted country is 
tempted to monetize its debt, so that the REER transmission would take place more in the form 
of higher inflation rather than nominal exchange rate flexibility. 
Even when it adopts stable exchange rate movements, a developing country with more 
developed financial markets could make the extent of REER synchronization smaller (Table 3 
(e)), though the interactive impact of financial openness is negligible or insignificant. Again, if a 
shock occurs to the CE’s, the shock would be transmitted to peripheral economies with more 
developed financial markets rather through nominal exchange rate movements. 
Overall, the results shown in Tables 2-1 and 2-2 demonstrate that the types of exchange 
rate regimes do matter for the degree of linkage of financial variables between the center and 
peripheral economies, both directly and indirectly through other macroeconomic variables such 
as current account balances, gross government debt, trade linkages, and financial development. 
In this sense, our findings are different from Rey’s “irreconcilable duo,” in which policy makers 
face only the dilemma between financial openness and monetary autonomy, not the types of 
exchange rate regimes. 
 




As we saw in the “taper tantrum” episode in the summer of 2013, a policy change, or 
even the mere mention of its possibility, by one of the CE’s may pressure non-center financial 
markets. Using the same framework, we now investigate how the financial variables of the CE’s 
affect the level of financial stress in the peripheral economies by focusing on the correlation 
between the financial variables of the CE’s and the exchange market pressure (EMP) index in 
LDC or EMG economies. The CE’s financial variables of our focus are policy interest rates, 
REER, and EMP.  
To calculate the EMP index, we follow the oft-used methodology introduced by 
Eichengreen et al. (1995, 1996), that is as a weighted average of monthly changes in the nominal 
exchange rate (i.e., the rate of depreciation), the international reserve loss in percentage, and the 
change in the nominal interest rate with all in respect to the base country in the sense Aizenman, 
et al. (2013) do to construct the trilemma indexes.25 The weights are inversely related to each 
country’s variances of each of the changes in the three components.  
It is straightforward to see how each of the CE financial variables we focus on can 
influence the EMP of the peripheral economies. If the policy interest rates rise in the CE, for 
example, that might draw more cross-border capital flows into these economies, including those 
which used to flow to peripheral economies. That might increase the level of financial stress on 
the peripheral economies, as evidenced by some emerging market economies that experienced 
financial difficulties after the United States started tightening its monetary policy in 2013. Hence, 
we should expect a positive correlation between the CE’s policy interest rates and the non-center 
EMP.  
When the CE’s experience real appreciation of their currencies (i.e., a rise in the REER), 
given some price stickiness, that would create (expected) nominal depreciation pressure on a 
peripheral economy, which we depict in Figure 3 as an outward shift of the curve for the rate of 
return from holding CE’s assets in terms of PH’s currency. If the non-center economy does not 
pursue exchange rate fixity, its currency would depreciate (from E0 to E1). If it does pursue 
exchange rate fixity, then the non-center’s monetary authorities would have to intervene the 
foreign exchange market, decrease its holding of foreign reserves, and end up having a higher 
policy interest rate (from RPH,0 to RPH,1). Given that the EMP index is defined as a weighted 
average of monthly changes in the rate of depreciation, the percentage loss in international 
                                                            




reserves, and the change in the nominal interest rate, whether non-center’s monetary authorities 
pursue exchange rate fixity (i.e., no currency depreciation but a rise in the interest rate and a 
reduction in IR holding) or not (i.e., currency depreciation with no or less change in the interest 
rate or IR holding), its EMP should rise. Hence, the CE’s REER should be positively correlated 
with the non-center’s EMP. 
Lastly, the link between the CE’s EMP and the PH’s EMP is essentially about whether 
and to what extent stress in the CE’s financial markets can be contagious and affect the EMP of 
non-center economies. We could expect that if a non-center economy is more financially open 
and pursues greater exchange stability, then it might be more susceptible to an increase in the 
stress level of the CE’s financial markets. However, at the same time, when one or more center 
economies experience a rise in the EMP, that would also lead to nominal (and real) appreciation 
of non-center’s currencies. In such a case, whether or not the non-center economy intervenes the 
foreign exchange market, it could experience a fall in the level of EMP, suggesting a negative 
correlation between the CE’s EMP and the non-center’s EMP. This is a question that has to be 
addressed empirically; hence, we examine whether CE’s EMP and the non-center’s EMP are 
positively or negatively correlated.  
With these theoretical predictions at hand, we first repeat the exercise based on equation 
(1), but this time having the EMP indexes of the sample countries as the dependent variable for 
all the financial variables tested as explanatory variables. In other words, we examine the extent 
of sample countries’ external policy vulnerability to the CE’s policies, namely, the center 
economies’ policy interest rates, the REER, and the EMP, while controlling the estimation model 
in the same way as in the previous analysis. 
Figure 4 is comparable to Figure 1 in that it illustrates the proportion of countries for 
which the joint significance tests are found to be statistically significant (with the p-value less 
than 10%) for the three financial variables for .26 We have figures for the groups of advanced 
economies (IDC) and less developed economies (LDC) for each of the three financial variables, 
each of which includes the proportions for the four vectors of variables. 
Interestingly but not surprisingly, Figure 4 shows that among the advanced economies, 
the proportion of countries that received significant influence from the global financial factors 
(i.e., their EMP is more vulnerable to the global financial factors) is highest for all of the three 
                                                            




financial variables in the 2007-2009 period whereas the proportion for developing countries is 
the higher in the 2010-2012 period immediately after the outbreak of the GFC. Generally, 
however, the linkages between developing countries’ EMP and CE’s policy interest rates appear 
weak. The proportion for the significant linkage rises in the 2010-2012 period, but only to less 
than 20%.  
The EMP of developing countries is a little more sensitive to the REER movements of 
the center economies. The proportion of developing countries for which the center economies’ 
REER are jointly significant for the EMP estimation is the highest among the vectors of 
explanatory variables in the 2010-2012 period.  
In general, the EMP of developing countries is more exposed to the influence of the 
center economies’ EMP. Especially, during the GFC years and in their aftermath, developing 
countries’ EMP is found more sensitive to the movements of the EMP of the CE’s, indicating 
that financial stress that arose in the CE’s must have been transmitted to developing countries 
during and after the GFC. 
Figure 5 illustrates the proportion of the countries for which the estimated coefficients of 
the CE’s financial variables are found to have a significantly positive or negative C̂  with the p-
value less than 10%. We predict 0ˆ C  for policy interest rates and REER, and 0ˆ C  or 
0ˆ C  for the EMP, whose results we illustrate in panels (a) through (d), respectively.  
Roughly speaking, when we focus on the test of 0ˆ C , the three center economies’ 
financial variables are relatively equally influential on the EMP of developing countries, except 
for the 2007-2009 and 2010-2012 periods in which either the U.S. alone or both the U.S. and the 
Euro area are influential, reflecting the GFC and the Euro debt crisis. It is interesting to note, 
however, that the highest portion of developing countries have their EMP significantly positively 
affected by the policy interest rate of the Euro area in most of the time periods. Also, the REER 
of Japan and the U.S. appear influential on developing countries’ EMP in the last three-year 
panel. Overall, the EMP of the center economies was jointly significant as an influencer on 
developing countries’ EMP in Figure 4, but the result seems to be more driven by the negative 
effects of the center economies’ EMP as panel (d) shows, indicating that the negative effects of 
the CE’s EMP is more of a case. Considering that the US dollar and the Japanese yen had been 




investors during the GFC and in its immediate aftermath, the crisis in the 2007-2009 period let 
these currencies to appreciate significantly. The appreciation of the CE’s currencies led to a fall 
in the EMP of these economies, which at the same time also meant depreciation of the currencies 
of the non-center countries. That explains the finding that more non-center countries’ EMP 
appears to be negatively correlated with the CE’s EMP during the GFC and the following period. 
 Figure 6 illustrates the average estimated impacts of the U.S. REER and EMP 
( USEMP
US
REER  ˆ  and ˆ ) on non-center economies’ EMP for the group of developed countries (IDC), 
emerging market economies (EMEs), and non-emerging market developing countries (non-EMG 
LDC) for the three year panels starting with 1995-2000 through 2010-12.27  
According to Figure 6 (a), the average impact of the U.S. REER ( USREER̂ ) on the EMP 
fluctuates but remains persistently positive for IDC and EMEs. Interestingly, the average 
responsiveness of the EMEs’ EMP to the U.S. REER slightly rose in the 2010-12 period.28 Based 
on the estimation results, for the group of EMEs, if the U.S. REER rises (i.e., real appreciation) 
by 10%, the EMP on average would rise by about 1.2. This (unit-less) figure stands for about 
0.6-0.8 standard deviations of major EMEs’ EMP, which is not unsubstantial.  
Figure 6 (b) shows that for the last decade or so, the impact of the U.S. EMP on sample 
countries’ EMP has been negative for both IDC and EME groups. Using both panels of Figure 6, 
we can argue that, if the U.S. raises its policy rate, that would cause U.S. REER to rise and PE’s 
REER to fall, which leads PE’s EMP to rise while the U.S. EMP falls. This is consistent with the 
nervousness shared among many EMEs since the U.S. Fed suggested the possibility of lifting the 
zero interest rate policy in the summer to fall of 2015. 
Now, we repeat the second-step estimation, but the dependent variable this time will be 
the estimated coefficient for the impact ( C̂ ) on the sample countries’ EMP of the CE’s financial 
variables: policy interest rates, the REER, and the EMP. We report the results in Tables 4-1 to 4-
3.29 
Table 4-1 shows that we do not obtain robust results when we estimate the determinants 









estimate for the variables of financial development is persistently significant and negative, 
suggesting that a country equipped with more developed financial markets tends to be able to 
shield itself from the center economies’ policy interest rate changes affecting its EMP. 
Interestingly, while we found that a country with more developed financial markets tends to have 
a policy rate more sensitive to those of the center economies in Table 1-1, here, more developed 
financial markets may also help absorb and internalize shocks from changes in the center 
economies’ policy interest rates. That might explain the motivation for developing countries to 
develop their financial markets.  
Such an insulating effect of financial development is also observed in the results for the 
factors affecting the link between the center economies’ REER and the sample countries’ EMP 
as is shown in Table 4-2. The negative coefficient on financial openness appears somewhat 
counterintuitive, considering that more open financial markets would allow for more rapid 
capital flight if center economies experience real appreciation of their currencies. However, more 
open financial markets often lead to more financial development (Chinn and Ito, 2006), so that it 
may also complement the shock-absorbing effect of general financial development. Or, it could 
be also possible that an economy with greater financial openness – especially toward outward 
capital flows – may be able to benefit from more risk sharing. While developing countries with 
greater inflation volatility tend to have their EMP more vulnerable to real appreciation of the 
CE’s currencies, we also see some evidence that those with worse current account balances or 
deficit, also tend to be more vulnerable to the CE’s currency values. In contrast to financial 
openness being a significant factor, the types of exchange rate regimes do not appear to affect the 
link between the CE’s REER and the peripheral economies’ EMP. 
The estimated effect of greater import demand from the CEs is found negative. If the 
CE’s currencies experience real appreciation, a peripheral economy that has stronger trade ties 
with the center economies could experience real depreciation especially when it has stronger 
trade ties with the center economies. 
Table 4-3 reports the results of the estimates regarding the factors affecting the impact of 
the CE’s EMP on the non-center countries’ EMP. While higher levels of financial openness, 
inflation volatility, and financial development might lead developing countries to face higher, or 
more positive, degrees of connectivity between the CEs and non-center economies through their 




and legal development would lead to lower degrees of the CE-PH EMP connectivity. The latter 
group of significant estimates may appear puzzling. However, Panel (d) of Figure 5 helps us 
interpret these results. First of all, there are more developing countries which turn out to have 
negative connectivity between their EMP and that of the center economies. Also, appreciation of 
the CE’s currencies, especially the dollar and the Japanese yen during the GFC and its aftermath 
contributed to lowering the EMP of the CE’s. However, negative sensitivity indicates that a fall 
in the CE’s EMP led to a rise in the PH’s EMP, and our results indicate that such a movement is 
more applicable to economies with higher government debt or budget deficit, current account 
deficit, and more developed legal systems. 
 As we did with the original model, we now interact some of the explanatory variables 
with the open macro variables of exchange rate stability and financial openness to examine if 
there is any interactive or indirect effects of open macro policy arrangements. We report the 
results in Table 5. Columns (1) through (3) report the estimation results on the estimated linkage 
between the CE’s REER and the PH’s EMP, and columns (4) through (6) those on the estimated 
linkage between the CE’s EMP and the PH’s EMP.30  
Since we have many interaction terms, we again estimate the marginal effects of a certain 
change in a macroeconomic or institutional variable for the levels of exchange rate stability and 
financial openness being either zero, 0.50, or 1.00 and report the results in Table 6. 
According to Table 6 (a), for a developing country with the greater exchange rate 
stability or relatively closed financial openness, greater financial development makes its 
economy’s EMP levels more sensitive to changes in the center economies’ REER. If an economy 
of concern runs a current account deficit, Table 6 (b) indicates that a peripheral economy’s EMP 
would be more sensitive to REER changes in the center economies when it pursues greater 
exchange rate stability or more financial openness, though the impact of financial openness is 
insignificant and rather small. When a PH economy strengthens its trade ties with the center 
economies (by 5 percentage point), it makes the PH economy’s EMP more sensitive to the CE’s 
REER if the PH economy has more flexible exchange rate regime and more open financial 
markets.  
                                                            
30 We do not report the results for the estimations on the link between the CE’s policy interest rates and the PH’s 




When we examine the indirect effects of exchange rate stability and financial openness 
for the EMP-EMP connectivity between the center and non-center, peripheral economies, Table 
6 (d) shows that if a country worsens its current account balance, its impact would be larger, or 
less negative, on the EMP-EMP connectivity for a country that pursues greater financial 
openness and greater exchange rate flexibility. During the 2007-2009 and 2010-2012 periods 
particularly, a country with worsening current account balance would face more negative EMP-
EMP link with the center economies if has more rigid exchange rate regime and more closed 
financial markets while the effect of an exchange rate regime type is stronger than that of 
financial openness regime.  
Similar interactions with exchange rate stability and financial openness are also found for 
the impact of stronger trade linkages with the center economies. Having greater trade linkages 
with the CE would contribute to more positive EMP-EMP linkages if a country pursues greater 
financial openness and greater exchange rate flexibility. However, it also means that the extent of 
the negative EMP-EMP relationship is stronger for a country with more closed financial markets 
and a more rigid exchange rate regime though the estimate with exchange rate regimes is 
statistically insignificant.  
Hence, as was in the previous analysis, open macro policy arrangements have not just 
direct but also indirect impacts on the linkage between the center economies’ policy interest rates, 
REER, or EMP and our sample developing countries’ EMP. Hence, it is safe to conclude that 
trilemma policy arrangements do affect the sensitivity of developing countries to policy changes 
in the center economies, although not always in accord with priors. 
 
5. Concluding Remarks 
Shocks occurring to the center economies are transmitted to other parts of the world, 
often buffeting smaller, open economies such emerging market economies. The increasingly 
integrated nature of the global financial markets may require a re-think of the role of monetary 
policy and the trilemma hypothesis, particularly in this post-Global Financial Crisis (GFC) 
period. 
This paper investigates the questions of whether and how the financial conditions of 
developing and emerging market countries are affected by the movements of financial variables 




method relies upon a two-step approach. We first investigate the extent of sensitivity of several 
important financial variables, such as policy interest rate and the real effective exchange rates, to 
those of the center economies while controlling for global and domestic factors. Once we 
measure the degree of sensitivity, we examine the determinants of sensitivity by examining a 
number of country-specific macroeconomic conditions or policies, real or financial linkages with 
the center economy, and the levels of institutional development.  
We find that for both policy interest rates and the REER, the link with the CE’s has been 
dominant for developing and emerging market economies in the last two decades. At the same 
time, the movements of policy interest rates are found to be more sensitive to global financial 
shocks around the time of the emerging markets’ crises in the late 1990s and early 2000s and 
since the time of the GFC of 2008.  
While China’s weight in the world economic output has clearly increased dramatically, 
including China as one of the center economies does not necessarily increase the goodness of fit 
in the regressions estimating financial variable sensitivity. This finding suggests that, for now, 
China does not exert substantial influence in financial markets on a level rivalling that of other 
center economies such as the U.S., the Euro area, and Japan. 
The results from the second step estimates that investigate the determinants of sensitivity 
to the CE’s financial variables suggest that while the levels of direct trade linkage, financial 
linkage through FDI, trade competition, financial development, current account balances, and 
national debt are important, the arrangement of open macro policies such as the exchange rate 
regime and financial openness are also found to have direct influences on the sensitivity to the 
CE’s. As theory suggests, we find that an economy that pursues greater exchange rate stability 
and financial openness would face a stronger link with the CE’s through policy interest rates and 
REER movements. 
We also find that the degree of exchange rate stability and financial openness do matter 
for the level of sensitivity when they are interacted with other variables such as current account 
balances, gross national debt, trade demand, and financial development. For example, if a 
developing country receives higher import demand from the CE’s, that would strengthen the link 
between the peripheral and center economies through policy interest rates when the PH has a 
policy arrangement of pursuing both greater exchange rate stability and financial openness. Such 




between CE’s and PH’s REER. Thus, we conclude that open macro policy arrangements do have 
both direct and indirect impacts on the extent of sensitivity to the center economies.  
We also investigate whether the exchange market pressure (EMP) of the PH’s is sensitive 
to the movements of the CE’s policy interest rates, REER, and EMP. We find that the EMP of 
the PH’s is sensitive to the movements of the center economies’ REER and the EMP during the 
GFC and the following period. 
When we reapply the second-step estimation to the estimated sensitivity of our sample 
countries’ EMP to the CE’s financial variables, we find that a country with higher levels of 
financial development can mitigate the effect of changes in the center economies’ policy interest 
rates on the level of EMP it faces. While the real appreciation of the CE’s could lead to higher 
EMP of the peripheral economies, higher levels of financial development, greater financial 
openness, strong trade ties with the CEs, and more stable inflation would help reduce the EMP 
sensitivity to center economies’ REER. 
While higher levels of financial openness, inflation volatility, and financial development 
lead developing countries to face higher, or more positive, degrees of sensitivity between the 
CE’s and non-center’s EMP, higher levels of government debt or budget deficit, current account 
deficit, trade demand, and legal development lead to the opposite. These characteristics are 
consistent with those of many countries whose EMP negatively related with the CE’s EMP 
during and after the GFC. 
The impact of the interaction between open macro policy variables with macroeconomic 
and institutional conditions are also detected. For example, when a country pursues greater 
exchange rate stability but less of financial openness, more financial development makes its 
economy’s EMP levels more sensitive to changes in the center economies’ REER. If a non-
center economy runs current account deficit, its sensitivity to the REER the center economies 
would rise when it pursues greater exchange rate stability. A current account deficit country 
finds its EMP more positively correlated with the EMP of the center economies if it pursues 
greater financial openness and greater exchange rate flexibility. Having greater trade linkages 
with the CE contributes to more positive EMP-EMP linkages if a country pursues greater 
financial openness. Thus, trilemma policy arrangements do affect the sensitivity of developing 




In this study, not only do we evidence that the open macro policy choice is “still” dictated 
by the hypothesis of the trilemma, but also we provide much more nuanced, indirect effects of 
trilemma policy arrangements. Particularly, unlike the recent “irreconcilable duo” argument, we 
do find that the types of exchange rate regimes do affect the extent of sensitivity to changes in 
financial conditions or policies in the center economies. Hence, the requiem for the trilemma 
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Appendix: Data Descriptions and Sources 
 
Policy short-term interest rate – money market rates Extracted from the IMF’s International 
Financial Statistics (IFS).  
Stock market prices – stock market price indices from the IFS 
Sovereign bond spread – the difference between the long-term interest rate (usually 10 year 
government bond) and the policy short-term interest rate – i.e., the slope of the yield curve, IFS.  
Real effective exchange rate (REER) – REER index from the IFS. An increase indicates 
appreciation. 
Global interest rate – the first principal component of U.S. FRB, ECB, and Bank of Japan’s 
policy interest rates. 
Commodity prices – the first principal component of oil prices and commodity prices, both from 
the IFS. 
VIX index – It is available in http://www.cboe.com/micro/VIX/vixintro.aspx and measures the 
implied volatility of S&P 500 index options. 
“Ted spread” – It is the difference between the 3-month Eurodollar Deposit Rate in London and 
the 3-month U.S. Treasury Bill yield. 
Industrial production (IP) – It is based on the industrial production index from the IFS. 
Exchange rate stability (ERS) and financial openness (KAOPEN) indexes – From the trilemma 
indexes by Aizenman, et al. (2013). 
International reserves (IR) – international reserves minus gold divided by nominal GDP. The 
data are extracted from the IFS. 
Gross national debt and general budget balance – both are included as shares of GDP and 
obtained from the World Economic Outlook (WEO) database. 
Trade demand by the center economies (
ipLINKTR _ ) – ip
C
ipip GDPIMPLINKTR _  where CiIMP
is total imports into center economy C from country i, that is normalized by country i’s GDP 
based on the data from the IMF Direction of Trade database. 
FDI provided by the center economies ( C
iFDINV )– It is the ratio of the total stock of foreign 
direct investment from country C in country i as a share of country i’s GDP. We use the OECD 
International Direct Investment database. Due to possible nonstationarity of the data series, we 
include the first-difference of the FDI data series. 






























kWExp ,  is exports from large-country c to every other country in the world (W) in industrial sector 
k whereas W
kWExp , is exports from every country in the world to every other country in the world 
(i.e. total global exports) in industrial sector k. i




country in the world in industrial sector k, and GDPi is GDP for country i. We assume 
merchandise exports are composed of five industrial sectors (K), that is, manufacturing, 
agricultural products, metals, fuel, and food. 
This index is normalized using the maximum value of the product in parentheses for every 
country pair in the sample. Thus, it ranges between zero and one.31 A higher value of this 
variable means that country i’s has more comparable trade structure to the center economies. 
Financial development (FD) – It is the first principal component of private credit creation, stock 
market capitalization, stock market total value, and private bond market capitalization all as 
shares of GDP.32 
Legal development (LEGAL) – It is the first principal component of law and order (LAO), 
bureaucratic quality (BQ), and anti-corruption measures (CORRUPT), all from the ICRG 
database. Higher values of these variables indicate better conditions. 
Currency crisis (CURRENCY) – It is from Aizenman and Ito (2013) who use the exchange 
market pressure (EMP) index using the exchange rate against the currency of the base country. 
We use two standard deviations of the EMP as the threshold to identify a currency crisis. 
Banking crisis (BANKCRISIS) – It is from Aizenman and Ito (2013) who follow the 
methodology of Laeven and Valencia (2008, 2010, 2012). For more details, see Appendix 1 of 
Aizenman and Ito (2013). 
Exchange market pressure (EMP) index –It is defined as a weighted average of monthly changes 
in the nominal exchange rate, the international reserve loss in percentage, and the nominal 
interest rate. The nominal exchange rate is calculated against the base country that we use to 
construct the trilemma indexes (see Aizenman, et al., 2008). The weights are inversely related to 
each country’s variances of each of the changes in the three components over the sample 
countries.  





















































b stands for the “base country,” which is defined as the country that a home country’s monetary 
policy is most closely linked with as in Shambaugh (2004) and Aizenman, et al. (2013). The base 
countries are Australia, Belgium, France, Germany, India, Malaysia, South Africa, the U.K., and 
the U.S. The base country can change as it has happened to Ireland, for example. Its base country 
was the U.K. until the mid-1970s, and changed to Germany since Ireland joined the European 
Monetary System (EMS).  
                                                            
31 This variable is an aggregated version of the trade competitiveness variable in Forbes and Chinn (2004). Their 
index is based on more disaggregated 14 industrial sectors. 
32 Because the private bond market capitalization data go back only to 1990, the FD series before 1990 are 
extrapolated using the principal component of private credit creation, stock market capitalization, and stock market 




To construct the crisis dummies in three-year panels, we assign the value of one if a crisis occurs 










Table 1-1: Factors Affecting Policy Interest Rate Sensitivity, 1986-2012  
  FULL FULL LDC LDC EMG EMG 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Open Macro Policy Exchange rate stability -0.167 -0.349 4.862 3.392 3.657 3.098 
(OMP)  (0.796) (0.878) (2.693)* (2.447) (2.448) (2.268) 
 Financial openness 0.223 0.249 5.455 5.777 7.930 7.491 
  (0.720) (0.805) (2.403)** (2.259)** (2.245)*** (2.154)*** 
 IR Holding -1.419 -2.034 -13.803 -11.343 -12.400 -13.557 
  (2.082) (2.277) (7.342)* (6.541)* (6.254)** (5.820)** 
Macro. Conditions CA balance (%) 6.550 5.943 19.282 24.284 41.092 39.017 
(MC)  (2.979)** (3.580)* (9.666)** (10.541)** (10.507)*** (10.451)*** 
 Inflation Vol. 14.135 9.400 19.270 23.910 9.839 10.727 
  (11.231) (6.003) (34.312) (15.012) (28.624) (12.515) 
 Gross debt (%) 0.064  -0.963  -1.420  
  (0.467)  (1.592)  (1.289)  
 Budget balance (%)  7.715  -2.145  22.313 
   (4.818)  (15.342)  (16.492) 
External Link Trade competition 0.442 0.390 -4.540 -6.454 -11.187 -11.246 
(LINK)  (2.764) (2.800) (9.166) (7.550) (7.868) (6.633)* 
 Trade demand -0.133 1.263 6.868 8.340 11.068 11.898 
  (3.104) (3.422) (11.125) (10.116) (9.170) (8.609) 
 FDI from CEs 17.785 19.231 49.264 44.044 42.633 41.347 
  (4.191)*** (4.791)*** (16.003)*** (15.113)*** (13.001)*** (12.732)*** 
Institutional Dev. Fin. Dev. -0.346 0.370 9.570 7.651 8.137 7.931 
(INST)  (0.699) (0.803) (2.500)*** (2.427)*** (2.207)*** (2.168)*** 
 Legal Dev. -0.718 -1.766 -4.831 -5.933 -7.132 -7.115 
  (1.384) (1.482) (6.555) (5.974) (5.530) (5.199) 
Crises Currency crisis -0.058 -0.739 -3.589 -2.712 -3.212 -3.422 
(CRISIS)  (0.658) (0.704) (2.595) (2.178) (2.167) (1.872)* 
 Banking crisis 0.415 0.596 0.544 1.410 0.766 1.292 
  (0.532) (0.574) (2.096) (1.838) (1.870) (1.676) 
 N 611 674 386 432 327 371 
 Adj. R2 0.05 0.05 0.09 0.08 0.12 0.13 
 # of countries 59 59 41 41 31 31 
 F-test, OMP  0.88  0.76  0.01  0.01  0.00  0.00 
 F-test, Macro  0.10  0.01  0.24  0.03  0.00  0.00 
 F-test, Ext. Link  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
 F-test, Inst. Dev.  0.59  0.49  0.00  0.01  0.00  0.00 
 F-test, All  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Notes:  The estimations are conducted with the robust regression method due to the existence of outliers. * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. The second 
estimation is conducted for the estimates C
Fi̂  from the first-step estimation that does not include China as one of the center economies. Time fixed effects 




Table 1-2: Factors Affecting Real Effective Exchange Rate (REER) Sensitivity, 1986-2012  
  FULL FULL LDC LDC EMG EMG 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Open Macro Policy Exchange rate stability 0.614 0.643 0.718 0.807 0.725 0.760 
(OMP)  (0.076)*** (0.074)*** (0.132)*** (0.121)*** (0.135)*** (0.123)*** 
 Financial openness 0.348 0.263 0.377 0.311 0.157 0.074 
  (0.077)*** (0.075)*** (0.126)*** (0.121)** (0.137) (0.132) 
 IR Holding 0.936 0.863 1.038 0.919 0.761 0.606 
  (0.208)*** (0.202)*** (0.334)*** (0.320)*** (0.331)** (0.314)* 
Macro. Conditions CA balance (%) 1.096 0.668 0.921 0.459 1.360 0.684 
(MC)  (0.342)*** (0.328)** (0.545)* (0.536) (0.563)** (0.553) 
 Inflation Vol. 3.429 -0.973 2.824 -0.840 2.706 -0.868 
  (1.234)*** (0.493)** (1.674)* (0.671) (1.672) (0.634) 
 Gross debt (%) -0.078  -0.072  -0.138  
  (0.049)  (0.078)  (0.075)*  
 Budget balance (%)  0.401  1.018  2.366 
   (0.472)  (0.963)  (0.956)** 
External Link Trade competition -1.606 -1.326 -1.625 -1.262 -1.275 -0.866 
(LINK)  (0.275)*** (0.244)*** (0.427)*** (0.372)*** (0.429)*** (0.374)** 
 Trade demand 1.744 1.703 1.763 1.877 2.022 2.151 
  (0.295)*** (0.280)*** (0.483)*** (0.460)*** (0.463)*** (0.439)*** 
 FDI from CEs -0.618 -0.634 -0.335 -0.372 -0.110 -0.272 
  (0.381) (0.380)* (0.673) (0.668) (0.643) (0.639) 
Institutional Dev. Fin. Dev. -0.002 -0.030 -0.171 -0.211 -0.076 -0.125 
(INST)  (0.071) (0.070) (0.119) (0.117)* (0.119) (0.117) 
 Legal Dev. -0.103 -0.098 -0.007 -0.212 0.076 -0.234 
  (0.138) (0.130) (0.296) (0.290) (0.296) (0.289) 
Crises Currency crisis 0.159 0.121 0.282 0.165 0.349 0.207 
(CRISIS)  (0.066)** (0.063)* (0.127)** (0.113) (0.120)*** (0.108)* 
 Banking crisis -0.013 -0.062 0.001 -0.108 -0.092 -0.204 
  (0.052) (0.049) (0.096) (0.087) (0.102) (0.091)** 
 N 537 592 294 332 254 290 
 Adj. R2 0.23 0.22 0.22 0.23 0.27 0.28 
 # of countries 49 49 30 30 23 23 
 F-test, OMP  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
 F-test, Macro  0.00  0.03  0.12  0.25  0.02  0.01 
 F-test, Ext. Link  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
 F-test, Inst. Dev.  0.68  0.51  0.33  0.10  0.81  0.33 
 F-test, All  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Notes:  The estimations are conducted with the robust regression method due to the existence of outliers. * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. The second 
estimation is conducted for the estimates CFi̂  from the first-step estimation that does not include China as one of the center economies. Time fixed effects for 




Table 2-1: Interactive Effects and Policy Interest Rate Sensitivity, 1986-2012  
 FULL FULL FULL LDC LDC LDC EMG EMG EMG 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Exchange rate stability 0.330 -0.619 -1.166 5.309 -7.884 -11.771 5.130 -5.971 -3.383 
 (0.909) (1.547) (1.733) (2.751)* (7.206) (8.226) (2.570)** (5.128) (5.496) 
Financial openness -1.575 0.323 -1.467 -1.269 6.516 5.335 0.974 9.544 3.303 
 (1.485) (0.750) (1.517) (5.169) (3.105)** (7.412) (4.436) (2.450)*** (4.863) 
IR Holding -2.079 -1.826 -2.209 -12.865 -13.232 -10.147 -10.817 -9.973 -9.538 
 (2.370) (2.217) (2.477) (7.555)* (9.713) (10.706) (6.644) (7.006) (7.298) 
CA balance (%) 6.666 13.660 11.367 28.248 41.970 63.029 19.791 32.486 21.459 
 (8.238) (6.801)** (10.431) (23.271) (29.384) (39.890) (20.440) (22.619) (26.431) 
Gross debt (%) 0.133 0.178 0.571 0.497 -0.544 1.770 -0.799 -0.481 0.318 
 (0.997) (0.924) (1.299) (3.049) (4.196) (5.395) (2.508) (2.829) (3.406) 
Trade demand -6.866 -1.300 -11.344 -4.779 -56.321 -100.895 -2.923 -23.766 -37.035 
 (8.407) (6.050) (10.104) (23.448) (26.507)** (40.442)** (19.569) (18.546) (26.549) 
Fin. Dev. 5.090 0.817 7.242 17.031 30.152 30.181 17.133 19.735 23.187 
 (1.670)*** (1.302) (1.986)*** (4.719)*** (5.726)*** (7.591)*** (3.992)*** (3.985)*** (4.896)*** 
KAO x CAB 0.682  2.780 -8.557  -35.884 41.950  32.968 
 (10.604)  (10.864) (31.196)  (44.266) (28.319)  (31.667) 
KAO x Debt -0.076  -0.167 -2.212  -6.466 -1.060  -1.710 
 (1.439)  (1.470) (5.014)  (7.066) (4.206)  (4.516) 
KAO x Trade Demand 9.961  10.946 16.625  43.098 31.202  33.056 
 (10.026)  (10.224) (29.872)  (41.279) (25.211)  (26.674) 
KAO x FD. -7.340  -7.209 -15.549  18.749 -17.676  -11.610 
 (2.097)***  (2.152)*** (6.714)**  (9.583)* (5.954)***  (6.511)* 
ERS x CAB  -13.799 -12.085  -49.790 -52.504  7.265 -2.590 
  (10.909) (12.174)  (43.898) (49.343)  (35.144) (37.970) 
ERS x Debt  -0.476 -1.044  -3.001 -1.671  -2.863 -2.430 
  (1.680) (1.878)  (7.163) (7.990)  (4.841) (5.062) 
ERS x Trade Demand  2.812 8.142  123.275 148.706  67.204 62.633 
  (10.849) (12.105)  (48.777)** (53.871)***  (35.799)* (36.936)* 
ERS x FD.  -1.977 -4.651  -30.529 -43.333  -21.751 -16.831 
  (2.200) (2.469)*  (9.015)*** (10.280)***  (6.665)*** (7.173)** 
N 611 611 611 386 386 386 327 327 327 
Adj. R2 0.07 0.04 0.07 0.09 0.15 0.18 0.16 0.15 0.16 
# of countries 59 59 59 41 41 41 31 31 31 
F-test, OMP  0.61  0.76  0.48  0.13  0.07  0.33  0.14  0.00  0.45 
F-test, Macro  0.52  0.12  0.40  0.59  0.50  0.43  0.77  0.56  0.88 
F-test, Ext. Link  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.12  0.00  0.00  0.27  0.00  0.05 
F-test, Inst. Dev.  0.01  0.72  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
F-test, Int. Terms  0.01  0.63  0.02  0.25  0.00  0.00  0.02  0.01  0.04 
F-test, All  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Notes:  The estimations are conducted with the robust regression method due to the existence of outliers. * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. The estimates for 
inflation volatility, FDI from the CEs, trade competition, legal development, currency and banking crisis dummies, and time fixed effects are omitted from 





Table 2-2: Interactive Effects and REER Sensitivity, 1986-2012  
 FULL FULL FULL LDC LDC LDC EMG EMG EMG 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Exchange rate stability 0.623 0.341 0.355 0.735 0.552 0.566 0.743 0.520 0.528 
 (0.077)*** (0.160)** (0.159)** (0.134)*** (0.327)* (0.331)* (0.136)*** (0.329) (0.335) 
Financial openness 0.330 0.362 0.309 0.523 0.431 0.537 0.381 0.188 0.392 
 (0.142)** (0.077)*** (0.140)** (0.277)* (0.122)*** (0.266)** (0.269) (0.131) (0.255) 
IR Holding 0.944 1.171 1.141 1.042 1.682 1.668 0.717 1.188 1.131 
 (0.208)*** (0.212)*** (0.212)*** (0.344)*** (0.333)*** (0.342)*** (0.342)** (0.326)*** (0.339)*** 
CA balance (%) 0.413 -0.194 -0.810 -0.139 -2.651 -2.966 0.110 -0.849 -1.175 
 (0.737) (0.640) (0.895) (1.056) (1.024)** (1.285)** (1.044) (1.036) (1.217) 
Gross debt (%) 0.064 -0.175 -0.042 -0.215 -0.435 -0.525 -0.278 -0.464 -0.541 
 (0.099) (0.090)* (0.123) (0.155) (0.155)*** (0.195)*** (0.146)* (0.147)*** (0.184)*** 
Trade demand 1.794 0.801 0.705 1.920 1.135 1.200 2.404 1.030 1.072 
 (0.722)** (0.547) (0.839) (1.019)* (0.879) (1.286) (0.972)** (0.843) (1.212) 
Fin. Dev. -0.165 0.394 0.252 -0.253 0.461 0.371 -0.260 0.475 0.276 
 (0.155) (0.124)*** (0.182) (0.217) (0.195)** (0.256) (0.213) (0.186)** (0.239) 
KAO x CAB 0.936  0.975 1.426  0.535 1.873  0.533 
 (0.928)  (0.915) (1.424)  (1.383) (1.487)  (1.463) 
KAO x Debt -0.228  -0.208 0.258  0.182 0.247  0.151 
 (0.135)*  (0.133) (0.249)  (0.242) (0.237)  (0.226) 
KAO x Trade Demand -0.033  0.385 -0.052  0.052 -0.291  0.032 
 (0.859)  (0.848) (1.340)  (1.292) (1.279)  (1.215) 
KAO x FD. 0.225  0.210 0.087  0.078 0.271  0.388 
 (0.193)  (0.191) (0.330)  (0.318) (0.337)  (0.324) 
ERS x CAB  2.010 1.827  4.950 4.834  2.873 2.722 
  (1.128)* (1.123)  (1.640)*** (1.672)***  (1.634)* (1.713) 
ERS x Debt  0.223 0.213  0.727 0.714  0.638 0.631 
  (0.164) (0.164)  (0.281)** (0.284)**  (0.273)** (0.277)** 
ERS x Trade Demand  1.823 1.534  0.759 0.748  1.893 1.809 
  (0.998)* (0.996)  (1.750) (1.782)  (1.734) (1.761) 
ERS x FD.  -0.798 -0.820  -1.326 -1.280  -1.217 -1.263 
  (0.223)*** (0.223)***  (0.348)*** (0.354)***  (0.341)*** (0.354)*** 
N 537 537 537 294 294 294 254 254 254 
Adj. R2 0.23 0.26 0.26 0.21 0.32 0.31 0.27 0.37 0.36 
# of countries 49 49 49 30 30 30 23 23 23 
F-test, OMP  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
F-test, Macro  0.10  0.01  0.09  0.22  0.00  0.00  0.13  0.00  0.01 
F-test, Ext. Link  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.02  0.01 
F-test, Inst. Dev.  0.23  0.01  0.32  0.47  0.03  0.23  0.46  0.02  0.29 
F-test, Int. Terms  0.17  0.00  0.00  0.68  0.00  0.00  0.51  0.00  0.00 
F-test, All  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Notes:  The estimations are conducted with the robust regression method due to the existence of outliers. * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. The estimates for 
inflation volatility, FDI from the CEs, trade competition, legal development, currency and banking crisis dummies, and fixed effects are omitted from 





Table 3: Net Effects for Developing Countries Conditional on KAOPEN and ERS 
(a) Effect of Financial Development (+10 ppt) 
in the MM-MM Link Estimation 
  KAOPEN* 
  0.00  0.50  1.00 
ERS*  0.00  3.02 3.96 4.89 
  0.50  0.85 1.79 2.73 
  1.00  -1.32 -0.38 0.56 
(b) Effect of Trade Demand (+5 ppt)  
in the MM-MM Link Estimation 
  KAOPEN 
  0.00  0.50  1.00 
ERS*  0.00  -5.04 -3.97 -2.89 
  0.50  -1.33 -0.25 0.83 
  1.00  2.39 3.47 4.55 
(c) Effect of CAB Deterioration (–2 ppt) 
in the REER-REER Link Estimation 
  KAOPEN 
  0.00  0.50  1.00 
ERS*  0.00  0.06 0.05 0.05 
  0.50  0.01 0.01 0.00 
  1.00  -0.04 -0.04 -0.05 
(d) Effect of Gross Debt (+10 ppt) 
 in the REER-REER Link Estimation 
  KAOPEN 
  0.00  0.50  1.00 
ERS*  0.00  -0.05 -0.04 -0.03 
  0.50  -0.02 -0.01 0.00 
  1.00  0.02 0.03 0.04 
 (e) Effect of Financial Development (+10 ppt) 
in the REER-REER Estimation 
  KAOPEN 
  0.00  0.50  1.00 
ERS*  0.00  0.04 0.04 0.04 
  0.50  -0.03 -0.02 -0.02 
  1.00  -0.09 -0.09 -0.08 
Note: “*” superscripted to KAOPEN or ERS in the tables means that the interaction term between KAOPEN or ERS and the variable of concern is found to be 




Table 4-1: Factors Affecting Exchange Market Pressure Sensitivity to Core Interest Rates, 1986-2012 
  FULL FULL LDC LDC EMG EMG 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Open Macro Policy Exchange rate stability 19.51 42.38 109.52 116.18 -27.89 18.89 
(OMP)  (74.81) (65.80) (178.29) (151.16) (166.17) (143.51) 
 Financial openness 29.82 -18.37 -176.90 -267.83 -64.27 -124.24 
  (69.70) (60.91) (153.11) (132.45)** (143.52) (125.55) 
 IR Holding 308.11 246.58 555.75 353.87 577.64 382.42 
  (198.48) (178.78) (478.13) (414.46) (413.08) (373.90) 
Macro. Conditions CA balance (%) 237.08 120.23 -182.76 -530.44 251.10 343.03 
(MC)  (289.19) (274.40) (617.52) (622.50) (671.41) (611.66) 
 Inflation Vol. 914.73 445.22 3,224.51 608.21 457.93 196.27 
  (1,245.72) (492.18) (2,521.27) (949.83) (2,134.15) (781.49) 
 Gross debt (%) -86.98  -127.91  -152.37  
  (45.22)*  (101.25)  (80.82)*  
 Budget balance (%)  129.37  1,423.31  362.80 
   (369.62)  (900.83)  (967.51) 
External Link Trade competition -31.18 37.31 577.77 771.16 -59.62 260.37 
(LINK)  (261.70) (232.57) (578.58) (492.02) (493.08) (426.45) 
 Trade demand 337.07 42.98 -173.50 -422.24 205.64 -107.52 
  (293.46) (256.64) (704.03) (599.29) (574.06) (501.74) 
 FDI from CEs -1,366.16 -973.90 -806.81 -646.05 308.98 348.21 
  (387.70)*** (347.64)*** (1,017.54) (885.59) (816.23) (731.21) 
Institutional Dev. Fin. Dev. -164.75 -144.22 -551.32 -525.94 -284.73 -316.95 
(INST)  (67.36)** (60.63)** (159.12)*** (142.14)*** (138.00)** (124.21)** 
 Legal Dev. 96.50 90.87 -33.72 -3.74 -164.35 -287.82 
  (134.15) (112.62) (417.41) (350.29) (347.30) (299.65) 
Crises Currency crisis 66.02 41.14 75.07 51.40 128.84 53.55 
(CRISIS)  (63.20) (53.84) (165.46) (130.15) (136.54) (109.50) 
 Banking crisis -9.38 2.81 -80.82 -54.80 -58.82 -60.30 
  (51.47) (43.73) (133.33) (108.92) (118.01) (97.87) 
 N 625 678 382 418 321 355 
 Adj. R2 0.14 0.11 0.09 0.09 0.10 0.11 
 # of countries 59 59 40 40 30 30 
 F-test, OMP  0.44  0.43  0.34  0.13  0.54  0.53 
 F-test, Macro  0.23  0.72  0.33  0.43  0.31  0.90 
 F-test, Ext. Link  0.01  0.02  0.60  0.30  0.90  0.89 
 F-test, Inst. Dev.  0.04  0.06  0.00  0.00  0.07  0.01 
 F-test, All  0.01  0.05  0.08  0.05  0.39  0.14 
Notes:  The estimations are conducted with the robust regression method due to the existence of outliers. * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. The second 
estimation is conducted for the estimates CFi̂  from the first-step estimation that does not include China as one of the center economies. Time fixed effects for 




Table 4-2: Factors Affecting Exchange Market Pressure Sensitivity to Core REER, 1986-2012  
  FULL FULL LDC LDC EMG EMG 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Open Macro Policy Exchange rate stability -4.296 -5.331 -1.954 -4.870 1.244 -2.477 
(OMP)  (3.269) (3.274) (3.291) (3.384) (4.044) (4.165) 
 Financial openness -9.415 -7.166 -7.360 -6.084 -8.324 -6.339 
  (3.046)*** (3.031)** (2.827)*** (2.965)** (3.493)** (3.644)* 
 IR Holding -14.635 -15.171 -9.791 -10.705 -11.470 -12.454 
  (8.674)* (8.896)* (8.827) (9.279) (10.053) (10.852) 
Macro. Conditions CA balance (%) -21.217 -16.464 -24.993 -15.372 -31.781 -20.494 
(MC)  (12.638)* (13.654) (11.400)** (13.936) (16.339)* (17.753) 
 Inflation Vol. 14.329 58.052 -2.863 73.630 13.702 80.103 
  (54.439) (24.490)** (46.546) (21.265)*** (51.937) (22.682)*** 
 Gross debt (%) 1.207  -0.992  0.257  
  (1.976)  (1.869)  (1.967)  
 Budget balance (%)  -8.721  -14.180  -24.878 
   (18.392)  (20.168)  (28.082) 
External Link Trade competition 16.175 16.889 16.344 17.914 13.900 15.391 
(LINK)  (11.437) (11.572) (10.681) (11.015) (12.000) (12.377) 
 Trade demand -14.134 -7.330 -25.070 -20.335 -33.885 -27.703 
  (12.824) (12.770) (12.997)* (13.417) (13.970)** (14.563)* 
 FDI from CEs 20.388 17.320 23.582 21.515 34.115 32.611 
  (16.943) (17.298) (18.785) (19.826) (19.864)* (21.223) 
Institutional Dev. Fin. Dev. -8.604 -8.868 -7.133 -6.044 -8.104 -6.107 
(INST)  (2.943)*** (3.017)*** (2.938)** (3.182)* (3.358)** (3.605)* 
 Legal Dev. 21.851 24.437 7.902 7.784 15.612 15.026 
  (5.862)*** (5.604)*** (7.706) (7.842) (8.452)* (8.697)* 
Crises Currency crisis 7.238 7.495 7.464 8.885 6.067 6.188 
(CRISIS)  (2.762)*** (2.679)*** (3.055)** (2.914)*** (3.323)* (3.178)* 
 Banking crisis 5.694 7.428 2.254 3.863 7.808 9.125 
  (2.249)** (2.176)*** (2.461) (2.439) (2.872)*** (2.841)*** 
 N 625 678 382 418 320 355 
 Adj. R2 0.15 0.18 0.12 0.18 0.14 0.19 
 # of countries 59 59 40 40 30 30 
 F-test, OMP  0.00  0.01  0.02  0.03  0.06  0.12 
 F-test, Macro  0.37  0.04  0.14  0.00  0.27  0.00 
 F-test, Ext. Link  0.31  0.35  0.19  0.26  0.10  0.20 
 F-test, Inst. Dev.  0.00  0.00  0.05  0.14  0.02  0.09 
 F-test, All  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Notes:  The estimations are conducted with the robust regression method due to the existence of outliers. * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. The second 
estimation is conducted for the estimates CFi̂  from the first-step estimation that does not include China as one of the center economies. Time fixed effects for 




Table 4-3: Factors Affecting Exchange Market Pressure Sensitivity to Core Exchange Market Pressure, 1986-2012  
  FULL FULL LDC LDC EMG EMG 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Open Macro Policy Exchange rate stability -0.091 -0.134 0.207 0.095 0.055 0.007
(OMP)  (0.115) (0.115) (0.140) (0.153) (0.167) (0.181)
 Financial openness 0.330 0.195 0.589 0.443 0.590 0.424
  (0.107)*** (0.107)* (0.120)*** (0.134)*** (0.144)*** (0.159)***
 IR Holding 0.363 0.425 -0.254 -0.185 -0.209 -0.134
  (0.304) (0.314) (0.376) (0.420) (0.414) (0.472)
Macro. Conditions CA balance (%) 1.305 0.597 1.327 0.852 1.494 1.051
(MC)  (0.443)*** (0.482) (0.485)*** (0.631) (0.673)** (0.772)
 Inflation Vol. 5.177 0.502 5.963 4.604 6.017 4.199
  (1.910)*** (0.864) (1.981)*** (0.963)*** (2.140)*** (0.987)***
 Gross debt (%) -0.140  -0.252  -0.268  
  (0.069)**  (0.080)***  (0.081)***  
 Budget balance (%)  0.721  1.888  2.322
   (0.649)  (0.914)**  (1.222)*
External Link Trade competition -0.634 -0.568 -0.355 -0.377 -0.246 -0.355
(LINK)  (0.401) (0.408) (0.455) (0.499) (0.494) (0.538)
 Trade demand 0.687 0.773 -0.829 -0.470 -0.594 -0.187
  (0.450) (0.450)* (0.553) (0.608) (0.576) (0.633)
 FDI from CEs -1.636 -1.859 0.428 -0.081 -0.245 -0.781
  (0.594)*** (0.610)*** (0.800) (0.898) (0.818) (0.923)
Institutional Dev. Fin. Dev. 0.138 0.100 0.269 0.235 0.217 0.163
(INST)  (0.103) (0.106) (0.125)** (0.144) (0.138) (0.157)
 Legal Dev. -0.311 0.019 -0.794 -0.554 -0.703 -0.405
  (0.206) (0.198) (0.328)** (0.355) (0.348)** (0.378)
Crises Currency crisis 0.205 0.143 0.424 0.538 0.382 0.547
(CRISIS)  (0.097)** (0.094) (0.130)*** (0.132)*** (0.137)*** (0.138)***
 Banking crisis 0.028 0.131 -0.068 0.097 -0.150 0.021
  (0.079) (0.077)* (0.105) (0.110) (0.118) (0.124)
 N 625 678 382 418 321 355
 Adj. R2 0.22 0.19 0.31 0.27 0.32 0.30
 # of countries 59 59 40 40 30 30
 F-test, OMP  0.02  0.15  0.00  0.01  0.00  0.07
 F-test, Macro  0.00  0.19  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00
 F-test, Ext. Link  0.02  0.01  0.22  0.52  0.37  0.49
 F-test, Inst. Dev.  0.26  0.53  0.02  0.13  0.07  0.41
 F-test, All  0.00  0.01  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00
Notes:  The estimations are conducted with the robust regression method due to the existence of outliers. * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. The second 
estimation is conducted for the estimates CFi̂  from the first-step estimation that does not include China as one of the center economies. Time fixed effects for 




Table 5: Interactive Effects and Exchange Market Pressure Sensitivity to Core Exchange 
Market Pressure, 1986-2012  
 Corr. b/w CE’s REER and Countries’ 
EMP 
Corr. b/w CE’s EMP and Countries’ 
EMP 
 FULL LDC EMG FULL LDC EMG 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Exchange rate stability 8.351 19.587 18.713 -0.277 0.402 0.439 
 (6.225) (6.890)*** (7.407)** (0.220) (0.302) (0.322) 
Financial openness -10.296 -21.161 -17.558 -0.204 0.097 0.118 
 (5.571)* (6.143)*** (6.421)*** (0.197) (0.269) (0.280) 
IR Holding -20.095 -14.726 -6.901 0.460 -0.058 -0.087 
 (8.947)** (9.031) (10.064) (0.317) (0.395) (0.438) 
CA balance (%) 59.261 67.269 28.283 1.191 0.973 2.029 
 (38.237) (33.026)** (34.914) (1.353) (1.446) (1.520) 
Gross debt (%) -5.544 -2.352 -0.804 -0.029 -0.281 -0.357 
 (4.768) (4.475) (4.500) (0.169) (0.196) (0.196)* 
Trade demand 39.433 8.589 14.270 -2.600 -3.573 -3.522 
 (36.107) (33.085) (34.822) (1.278)** (1.448)** (1.516)** 
Fin. Dev. -11.077 -10.351 -12.094 0.827 0.495 0.240 
 (7.359) (6.344) (6.609)* (0.260)*** (0.278)* (0.288) 
KAO x CAB -54.082 -24.893 -68.213 -3.164 -3.496 -2.907 
 (40.153) (36.908) (42.483) (1.421)** (1.616)** (1.849) 
KAO x Debt 5.922 -7.144 -5.077 -0.108 -0.170 -0.198 
 (5.373) (5.804) (5.926) (0.190) (0.254) (0.258) 
KAO x Trade Demand -21.672 18.136 -0.896 4.677 5.619 5.333 
 (37.200) (34.012) (35.047) (1.317)*** (1.489)*** (1.526)*** 
KAO x FD. -8.619 -16.551 -19.001 -0.635 -0.326 -0.243 
 (7.891) (7.932)** (8.584)** (0.279)** (0.347) (0.374) 
ERS x CAB -65.220 -108.129 -1.265 3.797 4.131 1.684 
 (44.338) (40.888)*** (50.437) (1.569)** (1.790)** (2.196) 
ERS x Debt 6.127 10.041 6.626 -0.013 0.313 0.431 
 (6.840) (6.647) (6.758) (0.242) (0.291) (0.294) 
ERS x Trade Demand -75.257 -90.629 -89.484 -1.263 -2.984 -2.035 
 (42.484)* (44.369)** (49.458)* (1.504) (1.942) (2.153) 
ERS x FD. 17.335 26.167 32.941 -0.510 -0.038 0.225 
 (9.273)* (8.749)*** (10.051)*** (0.328) (0.383) (0.438) 
N 625 382 320 625 382 321 
Adj. R2 0.16 0.18 0.16 0.22 0.31 0.32 
# of countries 59 40 30 59 40 30 
F-test, OMP  0.03  0.00  0.01  0.17  0.48  0.46 
F-test, Macro  0.29  0.23  0.88  0.04  0.01  0.01 
F-test, Ext. Link  0.05  0.07  0.17  0.02  0.06  0.13 
F-test, Inst. Dev.  0.00  0.21  0.06  0.01  0.11  0.42 
F-test, Int. Terms  0.11  0.01  0.02  0.00  0.00  0.02 
F-test, All  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Notes:  The estimations are conducted with the robust regression method due to the existence of outliers. * 
p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. The estimates for inflation volatility, trade competition, legal development, 





Table 6: Interactive Effects for Developing Countries Conditional on KAOPEN and ERS 
 
(a) Effect of FD (+10 ppt)  
in the REER-EMP Link Estimation 
  KAOPEN* 
  0.00  0.50  1.00 
ERS*  0.00  -1.04 -1.86 -2.69 
  0.50  0.27 -0.55 -1.38 
  1.00  1.58 0.75 -0.07 
(b) Effect of CAB Deterioration (–0.02 ppt)  
in the REER-EMP Estimation 
  KAOPEN 
  0.00  0.50  1.00 
ERS*  0.00  -1.35 -1.10 -0.85 
  0.50  -0.26 -0.02 0.23 
  1.00  0.82 1.07 1.32 
(d) Effect of Trade Demand (+5 ppt)  
in the REER-EMP Estimation 
  KAOPEN 
  0.00  0.50  1.00 
ERS*  0.00  0.43 0.88 1.34 
  0.50  -1.84 -1.38 -0.93 
  1.00  -4.10 -3.65 -3.20 
 
(e) Effect of CAB Deterioration (–2 ppt) in the EMP-EMP 
Estimation 
  KAOPEN* 
  0.00  0.50  1.00 
ERS*  0.00  -0.02 0.02 0.05 
  0.50  -0.06 -0.03 0.01 
  1.00  -0.10 -0.07 -0.03 
(f) Effect of Trade Demand (+5 ppt) by the CE  
in the EMP-EMP Estimation 
  KAOPEN* 
  0.00  0.50  1.00 
ERS  0.00  -0.18 -0.04 0.10 
  0.50  -0.25 -0.11 0.03 
  1.00  -0.33 -0.19 -0.05 
 
Note: “*” superscripted to KAOPEN or ERS in the tables means that the interaction term between KAOPEN or ERS and the variable of concern is found 




Figure 1: Proportion of Significant F-Tests 













































































































































































Figure 3: Exchange Rate, Interest Rate, and Real Money Stock of a Peripheral Country (PH)  
In Response to a Rise in the REER of the Center Economies (CE) 








































Exchange rate  
= price of CE’s currency in PH’s currency 
PH’s Interest Rate 





Figure 4: Proportion of Significant F-Tests – EMP Response  
































































































































































Figure 5: Proportion of Significant 0ˆ C  or 0ˆ C  Tests 
(a)  Policy Interest Rate ( 0ˆ C )    (b) REER ( 0ˆ C )  
 




Figure 6: Country-group Average of the Estimated Coefficients for 
(a) Impact of U.S. REER on Country i’s EMP 
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